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Abstract: Quantum communication is rapidly gaining popularity due to its high security and technological
maturity. However, most implementations are limited to just two communicating parties (users). Quantum
communication networks aim to connect a multitude of users. Here we present a fully connected quantum
communication network on a city wide scale without active switching or trusted nodes. We demonstrate
simultaneous and secure connections between all 28 pairings of 8 users. Our novel network topology is
easily scalable to many users, allows traffic management features and minimizes the infrastructure as well
as the user hardware needed.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum communication networks present a revolu-
tionary step in the field of quantum communication [1, 2].
Despite real world demonstrations of Quantum Key Distri-
bution (QKD) [3–8], the difficulty of scaling the standard
two-user QKD protocols to many users has prevented the
large scale adoption of quantum communication. Thus far,
quantum networks relied upon one or more problematic
features: trusted nodes [9–13] that are a potential security
risk, active switching [14–17] which restricts both function-
ality and connectivity and most recently wavelength multi-
plexing [18] with limited scalability. The ultimate goal of
quantum communication research is to enable widespread
connectivity, much like the current internet, with security
based on the laws of physics rather than computational
complexity. To achieve this, a quantum network must be
scalable, allow users with dissimilar hardware, be compat-
ible with traffic management techniques, must not limit
permitted network topologies and as far as possible avoid
potential security risks like trusted nodes.
So far, all demonstrated QKD networks fall in three broad
categories. First, trusted node networks [9–12] where some
or all nodes in a network are assumed to be safe from eaves-
dropping. In most practical networks, it is rare to be able
to trust every connected node. Furthermore, such net-
works tend to utilize multiple copies of both the sender
and receiver hardware at each node, thereby increasing
the cost prohibitively. Second, actively switched or “ac-
cess networks” where only certain pairs of users are al-
lowed to exchange a key at a time [19]. Similarly point to
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multipoint networks are useful in niche applications and
have been shown using passive beamsplitters [20–22], ac-
tive switches [14–17], and frequency multiplexing [17, 23–
25]. Lastly, fully connected quantum networks which can
be based on high-dimensional/multi-partite entanglement
to share entanglement resources between several users [26,
27]. However, the extreme complexity of changing the di-
mensionality of the state produced by the source makes
this approach unscalable. Fortunately, fully connected net-
works (i.e. where every user is connected to every other
user directly) can be achieved using multiplexing and bi-
partite entanglement [18]. Nevertheless, the scheme in
Ref [18] requires O(n2) wavelength channels for n users,
which prevents the technology from being scaled to more
than a few users.
Here we present a city-wide quantum communica-
tion network, with 8 users, that forms a fully connected
graph/network (where each user exchanges a secure key
with every other user simultaneously) while requiring only
8 wavelength channel pairs, minimal user hardware (i.e.,
2 detectors and a polarization analysis module), and no
trusted nodes. The quadratic improvement in resources
(the number of channels) used is due to passively mul-
tiplexing using both wavelength filters and beamsplitters
(BS). Further, to the best of our knowledge, we have demon-
strated the largest quantum network without trusted nodes
to date. Similar to Ref [18], just one source of polariza-
tion entangled photon pairs is shared passively between
all users and requires neither trust in the service provider
nor adaptations to add or remove users. We performed a
full QKD experiment on a city wide scale in deployed fibers
with a mixture of Superconducting Nanowire Single Photon
Detectors (SNSPDs) and a Single Photon Avalanche Diode
(SPAD). Further, we demonstrate a new topology withO(n)
scaling of all resources consumed using only 16 wavelength
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2and 2 BS channels to distribute 8 entangled states, among
the 28 links, between 8 users in a fully connected graph
using only one fiber and polarization analysis module per
user.
RESULTS
By using a combination of standard telecom Dense
Wavelength Division Multiplexers (DWDM) with 100 GHz
channel spacing and BS multiplexing using in-fiber beam-
splitters, we were able to distribute bi-partite entangled
states between all users from just one source of polarization
entangled photon pairs. The network architecture requires
only 16 wavelength channels to fully interconnect 8 users
as opposed to the 56 channels that would be necessary fol-
lowing our earlier scheme [18]. The network architecture
is best understood when divided into different layers of ab-
straction as shown in Fig. 1. The bottom “physical layer”
represents the actual infrastructure that supports the net-
work and comprises of a central Quantum Network Service
Provider (QNSP) and the user hardware connected to the
QNSP via distribution fibers. In the physical layer, the net-
work topology requires only one fiber between each user
and the service provider, while in the logical/connection
layer the topology naturally forms a fully connected graph
between all 28 unique pairs formed by 8 users (see Fig. 1).
Every user is equipped with a polarization analysis mod-
ule that implements a passive basis choice using two single
photon detectors each as shown in Fig. 2. Users can de-
multiplex the incident photons such that each detector re-
ceives fewer wavelength channels to improve their signal-
to-noise ratio and therefore the key rate. We generate se-
cure keys between all 28 links formed by pairs of users. Four
of these links can be chosen to have premium connections
with increased key rates, which when combined with ac-
tive switching can provide traffic management on the net-
work. Lastly, we demonstrate that our network is capable of
supporting a mixture of both SNSPD and SPAD based user
platforms.
The details of the QNSP are shown to the left of Fig. 2.
It consists of both the source of polarization entangled
photon pairs and the Multiplexing Unit (MU) comprising
WDMs and beamsplitters. All multiplexing is performed
in a single MU, co-located with the source in our imple-
mentation. To take advantage of existing fiber infrastruc-
ture, channels for many users can be sent along fewer fibers
and multiple MUs, at various locations closer to clusters of
users, can be used to create this quantum network. The
user hardware – a Polarization Analysis Module (PAM) and
two single photon detectors – is shown in Fig. 2 inset b).
Photons incident on a PAM are directed by a beamsplit-
ter along either the short path where they are measured in
the horizontal/vertical polarization (HV) basis, or along the
long path and through a half-wave plate such that they are
measured in the diagonal/anti-diagonal polarization (DA)
basis. The overall result is that the physical layer consti-
tutes a relatively simple hub and spoke topology, while in
the logical layer, every pair of users always share an entan-
gled photon pair.
We conceptually divide the 8 users of our network re-
ferred to as Alice (A), Bob (B), Chloe (C), Dave (D), Feng
(F), Gopi (G), Heidi (H) and Ivan (I), into two sub-nets of
4 users (see Fig. 1). A sub-net uses wavelength multiplexing
to form a fully connected network among its members – A,
B, C, D. Beamsplitters are then used in each of the wave-
length channels to duplicate the first sub-group creating a
second set of 4 interconnected users – F, G, H, I. Thus en-
tanglement is shared between every pair of users except AF,
BG, CH and DI as the above splitting also gives rise to con-
nections between the two sets. Two additional wavelength
pairs are then distributed between these pairs of users to
create the fully connected network of 8 users with only 16
wavelength channels. Each pair of users performs a stan-
dard BBM92 [29] protocol where the photons shared with
all other users are treated as background noise. A narrow
coincidence window, optimized in post processing and typ-
ically about 130 ps, ensures that this noise only contributes
minimally to the Quantum Bit Error Rate (QBER).
All multiplexing and demultiplexing in the experiment is
performed with standard telecommunications equipment.
The experimental setup (shown in Fig. 2) uses a broad-
band source of polarization entangled photon pairs at
telecommunications wavelengths similar to that described
in Ref [18]. Comparable sources have also been reported
in Refs. [19, 23, 25, 30, 31] where a ∼775 nm pump down-
converts in a Type 0 MgO:PPLN crystal to produce sig-
nal and idler photons with a Full Width at Half Maximum
(FWHM) bandwidth of ∼60 nm centered at 1550.217 nm
(roughly corresponding to the International Telecommu-
nication Union’s (ITU) 100 GHz DWDM grid at channel 34
(Ch34) centered at 1550.12 nm). Due to energy conserva-
tion during the down conversion process, only frequen-
cies equidistant from half the pump frequency can support
entangled pairs. Thus, wavelengths corresponding to the
channel pairs {Ch33, Ch35}, {Ch32, Ch36}, {Ch31, Ch37},
and so on are entangled with each other. The wide signal
and idler spectrum was demultiplexed into 8 wavelength
pairs as above and each user is given a combination of
wavelengths according to the table in Fig. 1. Thus each
user receives 4 wavelength multiplexed channels simulta-
neously via one single mode fiber and 8 different entangled
states are shared between the 28 different pairs of users.
The experiment was performed in two stages. In the
first stage the QNSP, MU, the 8 users each connected to
the QNSP/MU with a single fiber ∼10 m in length, and
the 16 detectors were situated in a single laboratory in the
Nano Science and Quantum Information (NSQI) building
in Bristol. To demonstrate the stability of our network we
recorded data for 18.45 hours as shown in Fig. 3. To be able
to account for finite key effects with a security parameter
of 10−5, we computed the private key once every 10 min-
utes and the figure shows the average secure key genera-
tion rate per second in each 10 min period for each of the
28 links (discussed further in the methods section). The to-
tal secure key obtained is shown in Table I. Users A through
3Fig. 1. The overall network architecture showing the physical layer, communication layer and the way wavelength channels are dis-
tributed: The network consists of two layers. (A) The physical layer contains the source of entanglement (blue) and the multiplexing
unit (gray). These form the Quantum Network Service Provider (QNSP). Our topology uses just one deployed fiber (red) per user to in-
terconnect all 8 individual users. (B) The communication layer forms a fully connected graph without trusted nodes for: entanglement
distribution, key exchange and secure communication (classical communication channels between users are not shown). Each line rep-
resents a link – the sharing of a bipartite entangled state. Higher bandwidth links share a second entangled state shown as a red line.
(C) Wavelength allocation: Every user of the 8 node network receives 4 wavelength channels denoted by a number (which corresponds
to their ITU 100 GHz DWDM grid channel number minus 34). I.e., ITU channel 34 (or 0 in the figures naming convention) corresponds
to the channel approximately centered at the downconversion degeneracy wavelength. Thus, a pair of matching colors or numbers with
equal absolute values and opposite sign denote wavelengths corresponding to an entangled photon pair. The regions shaded in blue and
yellow are identical sub-nets and represent the multiplexing using beamsplitters. The last row below the dotted line shows the additional
wavelength channel needed to fully interconnect the two sub-nets. Certain user pairs are connected by two entangled photon pairs (such
as Alice and Gopi via {8, -8} and {2, -2}) and consequently enjoy an increased key rate.
H used superconducting nanowire detectors from Photon
Spot while Ivan used a combination of one SNSPD and one
InGaAs single photon avalanche photodiode (SPAD). We
note that the use of heterogeneous detectors did not sig-
nificantly impact the key generation rates.
In the second stage the connection between the user and
the MU was replaced for 6 users by long distance links.
Furthermore, the SPAD was exchanged between Ivan and
Gopi. Alice was connected via a 12.6 km spool with a loss
of 13.3 dB, Chloe was connected to a loop-back from a lab-
oratory in the first floor of the physics building of the Uni-
versity of Bristol with a total distance of 463 m and 1.36 dB
loss, Dave used a 4.3 km spool (15.7 dB), Feng looped back
from the basement of the Merchant Ventureres Building
(MVB) through 1.625 km of deployed fiber (and a loss of
2.04 dB), Heidi utilized a loop-back connection from the
Bob Chloe Dave Feng Gopi Heidi Ivan
Alice 10.03 10.08 9.58 13.37 16.53 9.06 6.81
Bob 9.14 8.58 17.32 6.24 7.44 5.95
Chloe 14.25 12.64 7.01 8.67 14.63
Dave 10.64 6.33 20.27 11.45
Feng 9.01 10.80 4.44
Gopi 5.96 3.88
Heidi 6.43
TABLE I. Total secure key (Mega bits) for the laboratory demon-
stration as measured continuously over 18.45 hours after ac-
counting for all finite key size effects.
ground floor of Queen’s Building with a loss of 1.68 dB and
a total distance of 1.624 km, Ivan was connected to another
loop-back from the server room of One Cathedral Square
4Fig. 2. The experimental setup showing the multiplexing and demultiplexing steps anlong with the user module and distribution of
users across the city of Bristol: A source of bi-partite polarization entangled photon pairs with a broad band signal and idler spectrum
(as shown in the inset (A)) produces a |φ+〉 Bell state that is wavelength and BS multiplexed as shown. Wavelength multiplexing was
performed using 100 GHz ITU DWDM channels represented as coloured numbers plus or minus the central channel 34. BS multiplexing
used 50:50 fiber beamsplitters (BS). Photons were sent to each user via loop backs from deployed fibers spread across the Bristol city centre
(blue links in the above map) or several kilometers of fiber coil whose effective coverage is shown by the blue dashed circles on the map.
The measurement apparatus of each user is shown in the inset b). To the left of the dashed green line is the Quantum Network Service
Provider (QNSP). Maps plotted using data from mappyplace.com and mapiful.com. (A) The spectrum of the signal and idler photons
was calculated from data-sheet values and Sellmeier coefficients of Ref [28]. Energy conservation ensures that pairs of wavelengths when
at the same spectral distance from the central wavelength, are correlated. Such a pair of wavelength channels is indicated by the same
color number with and without the minus sign. The ITU channels numbers along with their representative colored numbers are shown.
(B) The Polarization Analysis Module (PAM) of each user consists of a beamsplitter to direct input photons along either the short or long
optical path. The short path measures the polarization in the HV basis using a polarizing beamsplitter (PBS) and two superconducting
nanowire single photon detectors (SNSPD). The long path includes an achromatic half-wave plate to rotate the measurement basis to DA
and measures using the same PBS and SNSPDs.
in the city center totaling 3.10 km (2.57 dB). Bob and Gopi
continued to be connected via short fibers. Thus, the 28
links varied in the effective separation of users from 16.6 km
to∼10 m. This shows the versatility of the network architec-
ture as both a local area network and a city wide metropoli-
tan area network. Table II shows the secure key rate over
these long distances in deployed fiber and in fiber spools.
The QBER, and hence the secure key rate, in our proof of
principle experiment was limited by two main experimen-
tal imperfections: Firstly, a more careful fiber neutraliza-
tion procedure using the manual Fiber Polarization Con-
trollers would significantly improve the QBER. Secondly,
the alignment of the HWP and extinction ratio of the po-
larizing beamsplitter (PBS) used in each user’s PAM could
be further optimized (see supplementary material).
Further optimization of the secure key rate is possible by
adjusting the pump power in the source thus, changing the
pair generation rate (see Fig. 4). We cannot adjust the pair
generation rate in each pair of wavelength channels sepa-
rately. Thus the optimum pump power is strongly effected
by the different types/alignment of user hardware (like de-
tectors and PAMs) in the network.
Nevertheless, the measured QBER proved to be stable
in an 18.45 hours laboratory test (see Fig. 5) and resulted
in a stable and positive overall secure key rate in a 7 hour
metropolitan quantum communication network demon-
stration (see Fig. 6).
Using a low-cost design for the polarization analysis
module at each node, any pair of communicating users (say
Alice and Bob) obtain three peaks in their temporal cross-
correlation histogram g (2) between each detector of A and B
for each correlated pair of wavelengths they share (see Fig. 8
and Fig. 7). Under normal operation in the absence of an
eavesdropper, the central peak corresponds to all measure-
5Fig. 3. Secure key rate over time for the lab experiment. A secure
key was generated every 10 min while including finite key effects
and a security parameter of 10−5. The length of each link is given
in Table III, while the average secure key rate for each link is tab-
ulated Table II for the metropolitan network and Table I for the in
laboratory demonstration.
Bob Chloe Dave Feng Gopi Heidi Ivan
Alice 31143 8926 6087 15590 38075 6637 901
Bob 23747 24171 83986 41239 9380 9787
Chloe 16850 14842 17910 9511 12694
Dave 1516 17004 14230 4356
Feng 20121 10142 810
Gopi 9954 3759
Heidi 1747
TABLE II. Total secure key (bits) over long distance links for the
city wide metropolitan network demonstration. We connected
4 locations/users across the city of Bristol as shown in Fig. 2 via
deployed fiber in a loop back configuration. Two other users were
sent signals through fiber spools and the remaining two were con-
nected via short (10 m) fibers. The distances of all 28 links are
given in Table III. Considering finite-size-effects, we measured for
∼27 minutes to obtain the final secure key shown. Here, we set the
failure probability of phase error estimation to 10−5. Fig. 6 shows
the overall stability of the key for 7 hours.
ments where A and B chose the same measurement basis,
while the side peaks correspond to A and B choosing dif-
ferent measurement bases. Since we do not explicitly note
down the basis choice, we must assume that the BS ensures
that we measure in both necessary measurement bases. In
general it is sufficient to assume that the BS has a bound on
its splitting ratio. (See supplementary material for more de-
tails on the security). We note that each user only shares the
time of a detection event and not which detector clicked as
required by the protocol. Since the two detectors used by
a user can have different delays or jitters, every user must
characterize their setup and modify the time tags before
they are shared.
DISCUSSION
We have successfully realized a complete entanglement
based quantum communication network with improved
scaling, traffic management, and long distance links via de-
ployed fiber throughout the city. We have shown the effec-
tiveness of a new and improved network architecture. Our
fully connected scheme can be modified at the software or
hardware level to create any desired sub-graph. Further,
by multiplexing states intended for several users into a sin-
gle fiber and demultiplexing them later on, our architecture
can easily support any desired complex network (see sup-
plementary material).
As the number of users increases, the QNSP can choose
to use additional wavelength channels, which (up to a limit
based on noise counts as discussed in the supplementary
material) minimally impacts the key rates of all existing
users. This detrimental impact can be completely negated
by users selectively detecting only the desired wavelengths.
Alternatively, to increase the number of users, the QNSP
can use additional beamsplitters which would reduce key
rates but drastically increase the number of users on the
network with the fewest additional wavelength channels.
However, this would irrecoverably affect the key rates of
all users. In our network, the physical topology grows lin-
early with each additional user requiring only one addi-
tional PAM and fiber. Photons intended for multiple users
can also be multiplexed through the same fiber to optimist
cost/convenience of distribution. We note that the network
is also capable of producing all possible sub-graphs, adding
or removing users and changing the allocation of premium
connections without altering the source of entanglement.
Detectors are a significant resource for individual users
therefore, we significantly lower the financial cost per user
by sending several channels onto the same detector at the
expense of a slight increase in QBER. However, this can be
mitigated by demultiplexing the signal on each detector to
multiple detectors. The all passive trusted-node-free im-
plementation could allow us to use active switching to in-
corporate additional functionality such as traffic and band-
width management, Software Defined Networking etc. The
∼17 km, or more, range of the network, as we have demon-
strated, is more than enough to create Local and Metropoli-
tan Area Networks interconnecting end users throughout a
city or building. This range can be further extended by re-
peaters, reduced detector hitter, wavelength demultiplex-
ing to several detectors and wavelength selective switching
to the same detector.
The number of users that can be connected to a given
network is limited by available resources, loss, and the
marginal increase in error rate with each simultaneous
connection established (with a given detector). The error
rate is theoretically limited by the probability that uncorre-
lated photon detection events can accidentally occur in any
given coincidence time window. In terms of resource, the
network scales linearly with respect to user hardware and
number of deployed fibers. On the service provider’s side,
the number of wavelength channels can be increased dras-
tically by using closer-spaced narrower-band WDMs and
by generating broader band downconversion. For exam-
ple, periodically poled fibers are a very promising method
of the latter [31]. Using polarization preserving methods of
6Fig. 4. Optimizing the average secure key rate by adjusting the pump power: The amount of secure key obtained per second can be
optimized by increasing the pump power at the source and hence the pair production rate.
multiplexing, such as an on chip design, would eliminate
the need for most Fiber Polarization Controllers (FPCs). We
were able to demonstrate this by connecting several extra
kilometers of fiber to many users and maximizing the key
rate using only the FPCs on each user’s module instead of
the FPCs of the service provider. Further, simulations show
that the network topology can be extended to 32 (49) users
divided into 2 (7) subnets while maintaining a reasonable
secure key rate (see Fig. 9).
The long term goal of a full fledged quantum internet
requires quantum communication networks that support
other forms of quantum information processing or other
quantum technologies. The vast majority of such applica-
tions rely on the distribution of entanglement between sev-
eral nodes making the current architecture an ideal candi-
date for further study.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Quantum Network Service Provider: The network con-
sists of the Quantum Network Service Provider (QNSP), dis-
tribution fibers and users. The QNSP is comprised of a pho-
ton pair source set up to prepare bipartite polarization en-
tangled states and a Multiplexing Unit (MU).
The source is pumped by diagonally polarized light |D〉,
from a CW pump laser emitting at 775.1085 nm which
passes through a dichroic mirror and a polarizing beam-
splitter (PBS) that defines the input and output of a Sagnac
loop (see Fig. 2) [25, 32, 33]. The horizontally (vertically) po-
larized pump light thus propagates anti-clockwise (clock-
wise) inside the loop. A half-wave plate (HWP) after the
transmission port of the PBS rotates the polarization by 90°
to vertical. This allows for injecting light in both directions
of a 5 cm-long Magnesium Oxide doped periodically poled
Lithium Niobate (MgO:ppLN) bulk crystal with a poling pe-
riod of 19.2µm in which vertically polarized pump photons
are converted to vertically polarized signal and idler pho-
ton pairs through type-0 spontaneous parametric down-
conversion, i.e. |V 〉 → |Vs〉|Vi〉. The photon pair contribu-
tion in the clockwise direction is rotated by the HWP and
therefore becomes |Hs〉|Hi 〉. Both contributions are then
coherently combined at the PBS and are isolated from the
pump light by the dichroic mirror. Ideally creating maxi-
mally polarization-entangled state s for each set of two dif-
ferent wavelengths,λ1 andλ2, located symmetrically about
the central wavelength at 1550.217 nm:
|Φ〉 = 1p
2
(|Vλ1Vλ2〉+ |Hλ1 Hλ2〉) . (1)
The MU consists of off-the-shelf dense wavelength divi-
sion multiplexer filters (DWDM). In addition, the MU also
has a set of 50:50 fiber beamsplitters. These components
were spliced together to distribute photon pairs from the
source to each of the 8 distribution fibers as shown in Figs 1
and 2.
The spatial mode containing the signal and idler pho-
tons from the source was coupled into one single mode
fiber and spectrally split by a thin-film DWDM from Opneti
(with a channel spacing and nominal full width of 100 GHz)
into 32 channels as defined by the International Telecom-
munication Union (ITU) in G.694.1. Our QNSP consists of
one 32 channel DWDM (of which only 16 are used) exhibit-
ing insertion losses per channel between 0.6 – 2.5 dB (and
a Polarization Dependent Loss (PDL) < 2.5 dB according
to the data-sheet), 16 add/drop DWDMs with ∼0.5 dB in-
7Fig. 5. Stability of the QBER over extended periods of time proves that polarisation encoding over fibers is a viable solution. We tested
the passive stability of our network over short links and a very long time of 18.45 hours. The QBER for each pair of users is shown here. In
addition, those users with premium links (i.e. more than one set of correlated wavelengths) shared between them have two independent
values of the QBER and are indicated using the subscripts 0,1. The secure key rate for this measurement is shown in Fig. 3.
sertion loss (PDL < 0.1 dB) and 8 standard fused couplers
with insertion loss below 3.4 dB (PDL < 0.1 dB). Optical
multiplexers form the foundation of DWDM networks de-
ployed by the telecommunication industry. There is cur-
rently two main technologies used in the industry, thin-film
filters (TFF) and arrayed waveguide gratings (AWG). TFFs
function by filtering wavelengths serially and are designed
to transmit a specific wavelength while reflecting all oth-
ers. They are made of a concatenation of interference fil-
ters each fabricated with a different set of dielectric coat-
ing. AWGs are single-stage filters that deploy planar waveg-
uide technology consisting of free propagating regions in-
terconnected by waveguides. The waveguides have differ-
ent length leading to constructive or destructive interfer-
ences in the output and thus multiplexing/demultiplexing.
Due to their low-cost and robustness against thermal fluc-
tuations, we have chosen TFF to build our QSNP. Also, the
main advantage of AWGs over TFF is that the parallel mul-
tiplexing approach is more conductive to high channel-
count applications, which is not relevant for quantum sig-
nal levels.
We selected 16 wavelength channels symmetrically with
respect to the degeneracy wavelength of 1550.217 nm,
which corresponds to ITU channel 34 (see Fig. 2 inset a)
). On the red side of the spectrum we used ITU frequency
channels 26-33 and channels 35-42 on the blue side. Due
to the well defined pump wavelength of the CW laser and
energy conservation during down-conversion, we obtained
polarization entanglement between pairs of channels (26 &
42, 27 & 41, 28 & 40, and so on).
Each of the 16 wavelength channels is then split by a
beamsplitter, such that in total 32 possible pairs of corre-
lated photons are available. Using further add-drop mul-
tiplexers before and after the beamsplitters, four chan-
nels were combined into each single-mode fiber to every
user. Since the partner photons for each channel can be
found in two other fibers, each of the users now holds eight
polarization-entangled connections to other users. This
means, each user is connected to all the other users, fea-
turing one doubled connection.
Fiber Polarization Controllers (FPCs) were used to en-
sure that the reference frame of polarization in the source is
(nearly) identical to that of the polarization analysis mod-
ule (PAM). It was not necessary to compensate all channels
8Fig. 6. Stability of the secure key rate over time. To compare the
test network in the laboratory with the real world deployed city-
wide fiber network, we summed up the key rates from each pair of
users. We note that despite the high losses and large distances in-
volved (up to ∼17 km) the network’s key rate remains stable. The
key rate in bits per second is shown while considering finite key ef-
fects for the Metropolitan quantum communication network (lab-
oratory test) in blue solid line (green dotted line) using block sizes
of 20 min (10 min). For comparison we also show the key rate of
the city wide network assuming an infinite key length averaged
over a block size of 5 min.
independently. Similar wavelengths were compensated to-
gether. At the end each user received 4 channels (see Figs 1
and 2) via a single distribution fiber and used a polarization
analysis module to measure in the HV or DA polarization
basis.
The distribution fibers were all single mode for 1550 nm
but of varying lengths and specifications. Several of the
fibers were deployed across the university and the city of
Bristol. We conducted two experimental runs, the first with
short distribution fibers and the second with varying link
lengths as shown in Table III.
Bob Chloe Dave Feng Gopi Heidi Ivan
Alice 12642 13095 16971 14257 12642 14256 15735
Bob 473 4350 1636 20 1634 3113
Chloe 4803 2089 473 2087 3566
Dave 5965 4350 5963 7442
Feng 1636 3250 4728
Gopi 1635 3113
Heidi 4727
TABLE III. Length of each link in meters in the metropolitan net-
work shown in meters. Bob and Gopi were users separated by
10 m of fiber each from the QNSP. Alice and Dave were connected
to∼12.6 km and∼4.3 km spools of fiber. The remaining users were
connected via loop-back to various locations across the city of
Bristol as shown in Fig. 2. Each link was characterized by an OTDR
and the measurements shown are the link distances in fiber be-
tween each pair of users.
Users: Each user in the network is equipped with the
polarization analysis module (PAM) and two single pho-
ton detectors. The PAM enables passive switching between
photon polarization measurements in two orthonormal
bases (either HV or DA). A beamsplitter (BS) at the PAM’s
input randomly directs incoming photons either through
the short optical path to the PBS and measurement in HV
basis, or through the long optical path with an achromatic
half-wave plate providing a 45° polarization rotation and
the same PBS for measurement in DA basis. The difference
between the long and short free-space paths corresponds
to 3.7 ns of time delay between, resulting in polarization
analysis in different time bins[30].
We designed the PAM to be completely passive, compact,
portable, simple and cheap to mass-produce and align,
but still robust and stable. At each PAM’s input and out-
puts to two detectors, SMF28e single mode fibers are con-
nected to collimators/couplers with custom produced 15.7
mm effective focal length (at 1550 nm) SF11 glass singlet
lenses (AR coated for 1500-1600 nm), with x-y, tip/tilt and
focus adjustment. Cube BS and PBS are mounted on kine-
matic platforms for rotation and tip/tilt adjustment. The
achromatic HWP is mounted in a manual precision rota-
tion mount. The long optical path was realized using un-
protected gold mirrors on tip/tilt kinematic mounts.
Commercially available BS, PBS, HWP and unpro-
tected gold mirrors were used (Thorlabs BS012, PBS104,
AHWP05M-1600 and PFSQ10-03-M03). BS characteristics
are T = (56±8)%, R = (44±8)% depending on input polar-
ization and orientation angle. The PBS in use have extinc-
tion ratios Tp : Ts > 1000 : 1, Rs : Rp roughly between 20:1 to
100:1, transmission efficiency Tp > 90% and reflection effi-
ciency Rs > 99.5% , where T and R represent Transmitted
and Reflected ports respectively and the subscripts s and p
represent the s and p polarized components. Achromatic
HWP retardance accuracy is < λ/300. Complete produc-
tion of lenses and optomechanics as well as assembly was
done at the Rud¯er Boškovic´ Institute, in the optical and me-
chanical workshops of the Division of Physical Chemistry.
The PAM outputs are fiber coupled and launched into
2 single photon detectors. We used 15 superconducting
nanowire single–photon detectors (SNSPDs) from Photon
Spot with detection efficiencies ranging from ∼70 to 90%,
a jitter of between ∼80 to 60 ps (including the measure-
ment device) and dark counts of ∼1 kHz and one InGaAs
avalanche single photon avalanche detector (SPAD) from
ID Quantique, model ID230, which has 20% efficiency,
∼100 ps jitter and dark counts of ∼0.05 kHz. After detec-
tion the optical signal is converted into an electronic pulse
and read out at a 18-channel time tagging module (Swabian
instrument model Time Tagger Ultra). Using a laptop we
performed an on-the-fly computation of coincidences, ba-
sis reconciliation and secure key rate estimation for all 28
QKD links.
Secure key generation: Due to the design of PAMs and
the Continuous Wave (CW) pump of the source, we only
know whether the measurement basis choice (of a pair
of users) was matched or not. Here the information of
which detector clicked directly encodes the measurement
outcome without revealing the measurement basis choice.
Thus, we cannot know the basis in which a detected pho-
ton was measured. Suppose the time delay between Alice’s
HA detector to Bob’s HA detector is longer than the delay
between Alice’s VD detector and Bob’s VD detector, then by
looking at the g (2) histogram, Eve can identify two differ-
ent delays, which means that Eve can guess what the mea-
9Fig. 7. Temporal cross correlation histograms between users Gopi and Bob illustrate how users generate quantum secure keys: g (2)
histograms between users Gopi (G) and Bob (B) are shown without obscuring the channel information. Each user’s Polarization Analysis
Module (PAM) detects photons in the Horizontal (H) or Anti-diagonal (A) basis on detector 1 and Vertical (V) or Diagonal (D) on detector
2. D and A detection events are delayed with respect to H and V by ∼3.7 ns. Four different histograms corresponding to each possible
pair of detectors between G and B are shown. From this data we can directly measure the QBER by comparing the desired middle peaks
(upper left & lower right) with the undesired ones (upper right & lower left). The data shown was integrated over one hour. To the right is a
simplified schematic showing two users connected to the Quantum Network Service Provider (QNSP) with the relevant detectors labeled.
The peak separation of 3.7 ns is primarily due to the optical path length difference is each user module.
surement outcome was and thus what the key bit could be.
Thus, all users must merge the time tags of all detectors into
a single data set without which-channel or which-detector
information.
Then, all users exchange their merged time-tags with
each other via the authenticated public channel(s). After
the time-tags are shared among all users, they calculate a
temporal cross-correlation histogram (g (2)) to find the co-
incidences. Users assign “0” or “1” to the measurement
outcomes where they both detect a photon within the coin-
cidence window and happened to measure in the same ba-
sis. After obtaining the sifted keys, all users perform the er-
ror correction and privacy amplification procedures to ex-
tract the final secure key. Assuming that each pair of users
has been able to identify and include in their sifted key only
those rounds in which they happened to measure in the
same basis (see security considerations in the supplemen-
tary material for more details), their final secure key length
n f can be calculated by
n f ≥ ns
[
1−H2
(
eUp
)
− f H2 (eb)
]
, (2)
where ns is the sifted key length, eb is the measured quan-
tum bit error rate, eUp is the estimated upper-bound of
phase error rate, H2 (x) is the binary Shannon entropy and
f is the error correction inefficiency (assumed to be 1).
Since we could not divide our sifted key into two individ-
ual bases (Z and X ), here we analyze the phase error rate
in the mixed basis case. Given failure probability ξph , the
upper-bound of phase error rate can be estimated by
eUp =αeb + (1+α)
√
ln4−2lnξph
ns
, (3)
where α ≥ 1, and the phase error probability is α times
bit error probability. In our experiment, we used passive
measurement modules with 50:50 beamsplitters to per-
form unbiased measurement basis choices, which results
in α = 1 [34]. Similar arguments can be made to show se-
curity even in the case of bias in the measurement basis
choice. From the experimental data, we can infer this bias
under the assumption that the fiber-coupling for both de-
tectors of the PAM is equal. Assume that the basis choice
bias of Alice and Bob is p AZ and p
B
Z , then the coincidence
counts of the left histogram peak between a pair of users
(as seen in the histograms of Fig. 7) is related to p AZ (1−pBZ ),
the coincidence counts of the middle peak are related to
p AZ p
B
Z + (1−p AZ )(1−pBZ ), the coincidence count of the right
peak is related to (1− p AZ )pBZ . Therefore, when the basis
choice is biased, one could first measure p AZ and p
B
Z by
monitoring the coincidence counts in the left, middle and
right peaks. Then, one can estimate α using these values of
p AZ and p
B
Z . More details on the security of this scheme can
be found in the Supplementary material.
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Fig. 8. Temporal cross correlation histograms between Gopi and all other users: Each pair of users identify photon pairs by their arrival
time using g (2) histograms. The data shown here was collected over one hour for user Gopi (G) during the laboratory demonstration of
the network. Users G and A share two sets of correlated wavelengths to enable higher key rates therefore they share two sets of g (2) peaks
(GA1 and GA2). Information as to which detector(s) clicked was obscured by all users. Fig. 7 shows the histograms between each pair of
detectors for the users G and B however, this more detailed graph contains information about the measurement outcome and cannot be
used to generate a key.
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SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
Scalability: We have demonstrated an eight-user quan-
tum communication network enabled by a single source
and wavelength/BS multiplexing. The number of wave-
length channels available depends on the available WDM
technology and the bandwidth of the polarization entan-
gled photon pair source. The current source has a band-
width of ∼60 nm (∼7492 GHz) and the WDM channels
used have a ∼0.8 nm (100 GHz) bandwidth. This limits
us to a maximum of ∼75 wavelength channels. How-
ever, broader bandwidth sources (such as supercontinuum
based sources of polarization entanglement) and or closer
spaced WDM channels (such as the upcoming 10 GHz
DWDM standard) would allow at least a few hundred chan-
nels.
Thus the real limit to the maximum number of users in
such a quantum network is the QBER, specifically the con-
tribution from “accidentals”. Given a particular photon flux
incident on the detectors of two users, there is a probabil-
ity that two uncorrelated detection events happen to oc-
cur within the chosen coincidence window. Such coinci-
dences are called accidentals. In our experiment, a user
opens a different coincidence window for every incident
wavelength channel as needed because of the uncompen-
sated propagation times of different wavelengths via the
fibers and DWDM channels. Thus increasing the number
of wavelengths a single user receives increases the acciden-
tal rate and the QBER, effectively reducing the secure key
rate. The QNSP can correct for the propagation delays be-
tween different wavelength and BS, when all users are con-
nected by fixed lengths of fiber, dramatically increasing the
secure key rates because each user will then need to con-
sider only a single coincidence window. Similarly the users
have two strategies to increase their secure key rates: use
multiple detectors for each measurement outcome, each
of which detects fewer wavelength channels; or selectively
choose which wavelengths are incident on their detectors
based on the connection(s) desired with select other users.
In the absence of such methods, minimizing the number of
multiplexed channels is the best way to increase secure key
rates.
By using k-fold beamsplitters, we can create nk subnets
between n users. Each subnet forms a fully connected net-
work with WDMs only using nk
(n
k −1
)
wavelength chan-
nels. Additional wavelength channels are needed to inter-
connect the different subgroups. This can be done in two
ways: First, we treat each subnet effectively as a single user
in a k user network and create a fully connected network
with k(k−1) additional wavelength channels. This implies
using nk -fold beamsplitters to distribute each of these extra
k(k −1) channels to all nk users in a subnet. When consid-
ering the link between just two users, beamsplitters can be
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viewed as losses. Thus mixing k-fold and nk -fold beamsplit-
ters can result in significantly different coincidence rates
between different sets of channels/users. Consequently,
the optimal pump power (i.e. pair rate emitted by the
source) will be different for various channels. With a sin-
gle source, we cannot optimist this independently which
in turn leads to sub optimal key rates. Thus in the second
method, we can impose the constraint that all wavelength
channels are split using only k-fold beamsplitters. Here,
each subnet requires n
k2
wavelengths and the network re-
quires a total of nk
(n
k −1
)+ n
k2
k(k−1) wavelength channels.
We note that the above formulas are valid only when n, k,
n
k and
n
k2
are all integers. To create networks with any inte-
ger number of users, it is possible to create a larger network
that satisfies the above conditions and not connect all users
as and how required.
With a fixed pump power of the entangled photon
source, the net effect of BS multiplexing a correlated wave-
length pair is akin to “time sharing” the key. When con-
sidering just two users, it can be thought of as additional
loss. On the other hand, wavelength multiplexing intro-
duces a new source of key. Both techniques adversely affect
the signal to noise ratio however, the additional noise due
to more wavelength channels can be avoided by filtering.
Thus a good topology makes use of a significant amount
of wavelength multiplexing supplemented by BS multiplex-
ing. Fig. 9 shows the secure key rate for different numbers
of users as a function of the transmission loss. For conve-
nience, we have focused on the use of 2-fold beamsplitters
(solid lines) and networks where n = k2, using k-fold beam-
splitters and k subnets (dashed lines). Maintaining a rea-
sonable secure key rate, within the constraints of the cur-
rent experiment, is possible for both 32 users in 2 subnets
and even 49 users in 7 subnets. This demonstrates how our
network architecture can be used for very large and com-
plex Local Area Quantum Networks.
Adapting the network for practical use-cases: In our
proof of principle demonstration, the source of polariza-
tion entangled photon pairs was adjacent to the Multiplex-
ing Unit (MU) that distributed these pairs among the users.
The users were in turn each connected to the MU by sin-
gle long fibers. In a real world scenario, the MU need not
be adjacent to the source nor must the MU be a single
unit. Photons from the source can be split and combined
in any physical location or in several locations to take ad-
vantage of available fiber infrastructure. In our experiment
the source was separated from the MU by a 8 m long fiber
and each component in the MU was separated by between
2 and 7.5 m of optical fiber.
Further, our network topology allows the flexibility
needed for a wide variety of use-cases. Longer distance, or
higher speed links can co-exist on the same network; these
can be implemented by using multiple detectors on certain
nodes where each detector measures some of the incident
wavelengths. Access networks are often preferred for low
bandwidth use-cases, however users sacrifice anonymity
when they request the Quantum Network Service Provider
(QNSP) to establish a connection with another chosen user.
Here, our topology is capable of supporting an anonymous
access network controlled by each user instead of the QNSP.
Optimizing the key rate: It is possible to significantly
improve the key rate beyond what is shown in the main pa-
per in several ways. First, increasing the pump power in-
creases the number of photon pairs. Given the detector jit-
ter, losses and QBER there exists an optimum pump power
at which the secure key rate (in bits per second) is maxi-
mized. Fig. 4 shows the key rate of all 28 links in the net-
work measured at 9 different pump powers. Note that when
the photon flux is excessive, a secure key cannot always be
generated. This is because of the increased contribution
of uncorrelated singles to the QBER via accidental counts.
Reducing the detector jitter is thus the best way to further
increase the key rates. Using a single source for the entire
network limits our control over the individual pair produc-
tion rates for each correlated wavelength pair. Thus using
different types of detectors strongly influences the optimal
pump power. In addition to different detectors, the align-
ment of individual PAMs of each user and the FPCs con-
tribute to the overall network performance. Second, using
a pulsed pump as discussed in the supplementary material
of Ref [18] would help reduce the QBER and significantly
increase the key rates. Third, in our experiment, we utilized
several manual Fiber Polarization Controllers (FPCs) which
were needed to maintain the polarization entangled state
at each stage of the multiplexing, demultiplexing, beam-
splitting and distribution. For expediency and to demon-
strate the success of our network topology, we considered it
sufficient when each of the FPCs were aligned with > 97 %
visibility. A better fiber neutralization would have resulted
in improved key rates. Lastly, in an attempt to keep the
costs of each user’s Polarization Analysis Module (PAM) to
a minimum, we used readily available sub-par components
which we estimate contribute to the overall QBER by up to
an additional 1 %.
Security considerations: In this section, we provide a
more detailed analysis of the security of the implemented
protocol. The protocol used in our experiment is slightly
different from the original BBM92 in the following aspects.
First, while the random choice of measurement basis is per-
formed passively in our setup by a 50:50 beamsplitter, the
users cannot tell in which basis they have done the mea-
surement. Instead, if after correcting for their time offsets,
they both detect a photon within a coincidence window of
width τc , they assume that they have both used the same
basis. In this mixed-basis case [34], the estimation of the
phase error rate from the observed bit error rate must be
done with caution. In particular, because, in our setup, the
employed beamsplitters in the receiver units may not be ex-
actly 50:50, one should account for its effect on the secret
key rate.
Here, we use a simplified picture of the protocol to ac-
count for the above two issues in our security analysis. We
only consider two nominal users, Alice and Bob; the same
argument holds for any pair of users in our setup. Without
loss of generality, we assume that Alice and Bob share the
same time reference and that the transmission delay be-
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tween the source and each of the two users is zero. Now
consider a particular pattern of detection events that corre-
sponds to a certain sifted key bit. That is, suppose Alice and
Bob have detection events, respectively, at time tA and tB
such that |tA− tB | < τc /2. We refer to such an event as a co-
incidence with time offset at the receiver,∆Rx, equal to zero.
(More generally, we have a coincidence event at a nonzero
∆Rx if |tA − tB −∆Rx| < τc /2.) There should then be a trans-
mitted signal to Alice (Bob) at time τA(B) ∈ {tA(B), tA(B)−∆},
where ∆ is the time difference between the long and short
optical paths, used for X and Z basis measurements, in the
PAMs. For simplicity, we assume the time delay in the short
path is zero.
The key point in our security proof is that, so long as∆À
τc , the only detection events that can be used for secure key
extraction are those for which |τA −τB | < τc /2. We refer to
such an event as a coincidence with time offset at the trans-
mitter, ∆Tx, equal to zero. More generally, we have a coin-
cidence event at a nonzero ∆Tx if |τA −τB −∆Tx| < τc /2. As
we explain below, the detection events that originate from
transmitted signals with ∆Tx = ±∆ can easily be manipu-
lated by a potential eavesdropper to give us insecure detec-
tion events. Note that in the trust-free QKD setting that we
are considering, we cannot assume that the source is trust-
worthy. Even if we make this assumption, an eavesdrop-
per can block the trusted source output, and, instead, send
her own signals to the users. Now, imagine such an eaves-
dropper is sending an A-polarized photon to Alice at time
tA −∆ and an H-polarized photon to Bob at time tB , with
|tA − tB | < τc /2. Then a detection event at times tA and
tB would correspond to the same bit but different bases,
while Alice and Bob would falsely assume that these are in
the same basis as expected from an honest source. How-
ever, the eavesdropper can tell without any error the bits
assigned to the sifted key in such a case. In other words,
in the terminology of the GLLP analysis [35], these bits are
tagged.
Luckily, such an eavesdropping attempt would leave a
footprint, which could be used to estimate the amount of
information that has leaked to Eve. In the example above,
a signal generated at tA −∆ may also take the shorter path
and cause a click at the same time on Alice’s side, while the
signal generated at tB takes the longer path and causes a
click at tB +∆. Having a coincidence event with a time off-
set ∆Rx = 2∆ would not have been expected if the signals
sent to Alice and Bob are generated at the same time. We
will use the collected data on the latter events to bound the
number of tagged sifted key bits.
Based on the above, for any coincident event with ∆Rx =
0, there are only three possible transmission time offsets,
namely, ∆Tx ∈ {−∆,0,∆}. The sifted key bits for which Eve
chooses ∆Tx = ±∆ are tagged: We should assume that Eve
can fully learn them without introducing any errors. The
sifted key bits for which Eve chooses ∆Tx = 0 are untagged,
and they can be regarded as having arisen from an execu-
tion of a standard BBM92 in which Alice and Bob have been
able to postselect the detected rounds in which they have
used the same basis, but not to learn their specific choice of
basis for each round. We assume that the signals received
in these rounds are in a qubit space (i.e., a polarized single
photon); if they are not, one can still prove security by using
the techniques of [36, 37] and assigning a random sifted bit
to events in which more than one detector clicks in a par-
ticular round. To estimate the amount of secret key that can
be extracted, we then need to obtain: (1) a lower bound on
the number of untagged bits N0,0 in the sifted key, where
NR,T denotes the number of events in which ∆Rx = R and
∆Tx = T ; and (2) an upper bound on the phase error rate of
these bits, which we denote as ep .
(1) Lower bound on N0,0: For bounding N0,0, we use the
fact that when Eve chooses ∆Tx = ±∆, the probability of
having ∆Rx = 0 is the same as that of ∆Rx = ±2∆. We de-
note the number of coincidence events with receiver time
offsets of either zero or ±2∆ by N . For event n out of these
N events, we then have
Pr[∆(n)Tx ∈ {∆,−∆},∆(n)Rx = 0]= Pr[∆(n)Tx ∈ {∆,−∆},∆(n)Rx ∈ {2∆,−2∆}]≤ Pr[∆(n)Rx ∈ {2∆,−2∆}],
(4)
where the superscript (n) specifies the value of the time off-
set parameters for the nth event. By Azuma’s inequality, we
have that
N∑
n=1
Pr[∆(n)Tx ∈ {∆,−∆},∆(n)Rx = 0]≥N0,∆+N0,−∆−δ,
N∑
n=1
Pr[∆(n)Rx =∈ {2∆,−2∆}]≤N2∆+N−2∆+δ,
(5)
where each of the bounds fails with probability ε, δ =p
2N lnε−1 is the deviation term, and NR is the total num-
ber of detections for which ∆Rx = R. The conditioning on
the outcome of the previous detections has been omitted
from all probability terms for simplicity. Combining Eq. (4)
and Eq. (5), we have that
N0,∆+N0,−∆ ≤N2∆+N−2∆+2δ, (6)
and, therefore,
N0,0 =N0−N0,∆−N0,−∆ ≥N0−N2∆−N−2∆−2δ :=N (L)0,0 , (7)
except with probability 2ε.
(2) Upper bound on ep : To bound the phase-error rate
of the untagged bits (that is, those bits for which ∆Tx = 0
and ∆Rx = 0), we bound the number of phase errors Nph
that Alice and Bob would have obtained in a hypotheti-
cal scenario in which they have made exactly the opposite
basis choices as in the real scenario. Let us assume that
p AZ = pBZ = p AX = pBX = 12 , where p A(B)K is the probability of
choosing basis K = X , Z by Alice (Bob). Then, the probabil-
ity that Alice and Bob both measure in the Z (X ) basis in the
real (hypothetical) scenario is the same as the probability
that they both measure in the X (Z ) basis in the real (hypo-
thetical) scenario. In this situation, we have that, for a given
untagged round, the probability that Alice and Bob obtain
an error is the same for both the real and hypothetical sce-
narios. That is, its bit error probability equals its phase er-
ror probability [34].
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If the measurement basis choice is biased, the two are
no longer necessarily equal. Say that Alice and Bob are α
times as likely to jointly choose one basis than the other,
e.g. p AZ p
B
Z = αp AX pBX with α ≥ 1. Then, if Eve makes the X -
basis error probability larger than the Z -basis error proba-
bility, the phase-error probability will be larger than the bit-
error probability. Still, one can easily show that the phase-
error probability will be at most α times larger than the bit-
error probability [34]. Then, we have that
Pr[∆(n)Tx = 0,∆(n)Rx = 0,phase error]≤αPr[∆(n)Tx = 0,∆(n)Rx = 0,bit error]
≤αPr[∆(n)Rx = 0,bit error].
(8)
And, by Azuma’s inequality, we have that
N∑
n=1
Pr[∆(n)Tx = 0,∆(n)Rx = 0,phase error]≥Nph−δ,
N∑
n=1
Pr[∆(n)Rx = 0,bit error]≤Nerr−δ,
(9)
where Nerr is the amount of bits in the sifted key that have
a bit error (i.e. eb = NerrN0 ), and Nph is the number of phase
errors, defined above. Combining Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), we
have that
Nph ≤αNerr+ (1+α)δ :=N (U )ph , (10)
except with probability 2ε. The phase-error rate can now
be simply upper-bounded by
eUp =
N (U )ph
N (L)0,0
. (11)
Finally, the length of secret key that can be distilled is given
by
n f ≥N (L)0,0
[
1−H2(eUp )
]
− f (eb)N0H2(eb). (12)
In the methods section, we use a simpler version of the
above expression in which we assume that ∆Tx = 0 for all
rounds. In this case, all sifted-key bits are untagged, which
implies that N (L)0,0 = N0,0 = N0 ≡ ns , and eUp in Eq. (11) re-
duces to Eq. (3) of the main text, with ξph = 2ε.
